

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BONN 08303 01 OF 03 131659Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00
PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-03 CIAE-00 INR-07
NSAE-00 DODE-00 IO-13 ACDA-07 /069 W
-----131720Z 104419 /53
O R 131633Z MAY 77 ZFF 4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8249
INFO USMISSION USBERLIN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 08303

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR PGOV WB UR GW GE US UK FR
SUBJECT: BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

REFS: (A) SECTO 4014; (B) USBER 1220;
(C) CHESTER-GERMAN LETTER MAY 2, 1977

BEGIN SUMMARY. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PREAMATURE TO
SUGGEST TO THE FRG NOW THAT THE ALLIES MIGHT BE PREPARED
TO PERMIT INCREASED FEDERAL ACTIVITIES IN WEST BERLIN AS
A COUNTERMEASURE TO POSSIBLE SOVIET ACTIONS AFFECTING
ALLIED RIGHTS IN EAST BERLIN. SUCH STEPS MAY WELL BE
APPROPRIATE AT A LATER STAGE, BUT WE WOULD VIEW THEM
MORE AS RETALIATORY THAN AS DETERRENT. FOR THAT
AND OTHER REASONS DISCUSSED BELOW, WE THUS THINK IT
PREFERABLE NOT TO DISCUSS THE PROSPECT WITH THE FRG IN
THE CONTEXT OF INITIAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING. WE
RECOMMEND THAT INTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS OF A
POSSIBLE STRENGTHENING OF THE TIES BETWEEN BERLIN AND
THE FRG CONTINUE, BUT THAT THE SUBJECT BE OMITTED FROM
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 08303 01 OF 03 131659Z

THE DRAFT CONTINGENCY PLAN THAT IS TO BE CIRCULATED
IN THE BONN GROUP. WE ALSO RECOMMEND THAT,
AS A NEXT STEP IN THE DEPARTMENT'S PLANNING, CONSIDERA-
TION BE GIVEN TO THE FORMAT WHICH THE BONN GROUP
CONTINGENCY STUDY SHOULD TAKE AND TO THE POLITICAL
DECISION-MAKING MECHANISMS WHICH SHOULD BE EMPLOYED
IN THE EVENT OF SUDDEN DIFFICULTIES IN BERLIN. GUIDANCE

ON THESE LATTER POINTS IS REQUESTED. END SUMMARY.

1. WE HAVE REVIEWED THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE US CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR COUNTERING ACTIONS AGAINST ALLIED PATROLS IN EAST BERLIN, TRANSMITTED UNDER COVER OF REF (C), AND CONSIDER IT A COMPREHENSIVE AND HIGHLY USEFUL BASIS FOR CONCRETE CONTINGENCY PLANNING. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE DRAFT IS NOW UNDERGOING INTERAGENCY CLEARANCE SO THAT IT CAN BE CABLED TO US FOR CIRCULATION IN THE BONN GROUP, AS OFFERED BY THE SECRETARY AT THE MAY 9 QUADRIPARTITE MEETING (REF A).

2. THE IMPRESSION BROUGHT BACK FROM LONDON BY THE FRG AND UK BONN GROUP REPS WHO ATTENDED THAT MEETING WAS THAT JUNE 1 WAS NOT SET BY MINISTERS AS AN ABSOLUTE DEADLINE FOR AN AGREED BONN GROUP STUDY, BUT ALL FOUR BONN GROUP REPS ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULD GIVE URGENT ATTENTION TO THE STUDY AS SOON AS THE US SUBMISSION IS RECEIVED.

3. WE ARE AVOIDING MAKING DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT, BECAUSE WE REALIZE THAT IT MAY HAVE ALREADY UNDERGONE CONSIDERABLE CHANGE IN WASHINGTON. THERE IS ONE POINT, HOWEVER, WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE DEPARTMENT BEFORE THE US DRAFT IS GIVEN TO THE OTHER BONN GROUP MEMBERS, AND THAT HAS TO DO WITH REFERENCES TO THE USE OF INCREASED FEDERAL ACTIVITIES IN BERLIN AS A COUNTERMEASURE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BONN 08303 01 OF 03 131659Z

4. WE RECOGNIZE THAT, IF SOVIET MEASURES AGAINST THE ALLIES SHOULD GO SO FAR AS TO DEPRIVE US OF AN ESSENTIAL ASPECT OF OUR RIGHTS IN EAST BERLIN, WE MAY WELL BE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 BONN 08303 02 OF 03 131658Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-03 CIAE-00 INR-07

NSAE-00 DODE-00 IO-13 ACDA-07 /069 W

-----131719Z 104378 /53

O R 131633Z MAY 77 ZFF 4

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8250

INFO USMISSION USBERLIN

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 08303

NOFORN

PREPARED TO AUTHORIZE A STRENGTHENED FEDERAL PRESENCE IN WEST BERLIN OR CLOSER TIES BETWEEN THE FRG AND WEST BERLIN AS COUNTERMEASURES. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THAT POSSIBILITY SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE GERMANS AT THIS EARLY STAGE, BEFORE WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED INTERNALLY, AND THEN IN CONSULTATION WITH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH, WHETHER OR HOW FAR WE MAY BE PREPARED TO MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION.

5. WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO THE DISCUSSION OF "FRG ACTIVITIES IN WEST BERLIN" ON PAGE 9 OF THE DEPARTMENT'S PRELIMINARY DRAFT, WE AGREE WITH USBER THAT THE STATEMENT THAT THE QA CALLED FOR A "FURTHER REDUCTION" IN THE FEDERAL PRESENCE SOMEWHAT OVERSTATES THE CASE. AS FOR "SANCTIONING MORE VISITS BY FEDERAL POLITICAL OFFICIALS," THERE ARE AT PRESENT FEW IF ANY ALLIED RESTRICTIONS ON SUCH VISITS. WHILE IT IS, STRICTLY SPEAKING, TRUE THAT NEW FEDERAL OFFICES COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN BERLIN WITHOUT VIOLATING THE QA, THE SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER IT A VIOLATION OF THE ASSURANCES THEY WERE GIVEN IN THE WAKE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY (FEA) IN 1974. WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 08303 02 OF 03 131658Z

TO LOCATE THE RELEVANT REPORTING CABLE, BUT NOTES IN OUR FILES INDICATE THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER ASSURED GROMYKO IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 27, 1974, THAT, WHILE PLANS FOR THE FEA WOULD PROCEED, "FURTHER FEDERAL OFFICES WOULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED IN BERLIN." WE WOULD FEEL LESS BOUND BY SUCH A COMMITMENT IF THE SOVIETS NOW TOOK STRONG ACTIONS AFFECTING OUR RIGHTS IN EAST BERLIN, BUT IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO RESEARCH THE RECORDS IN THE DEPARTMENT TO DETERMINE TO WHAT EXTENT A COMMITMENT EXISTS.

6. IN MORE GENERAL TERMS, THERE ARE SEVERAL PROBLEMS IN DISCUSSING WITH THE FRG AT THIS STAGE THE USE OF STEPPED UP FEDERAL ACTIVITIES AS A COUNTERMEASURE:

-- IT WOULD RAISE EXPECTATIONS ON THE PART OF THE FRG THAT WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO DO SOMETHING IN THIS REGARD. WE SHOULD AVOID THIS UNTIL WE ARE CERTAIN WE ARE PREPARED TO MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION.

-- IT WOULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR THE FRG TO CLAIM, IN LATER YEARS IF NOT NOW, THAT SUCH OBJECTIONS AS THE ALLIES DO EXPRESS TO INCREASED FEDERAL ACTIVITIES IN BERLIN ARE BASED ON OUR FEARS OF SOVIET REACTIONS. THIS IS PERHAPS ONE OF THE REASONS, BUT CERTAINLY NOT THE ONLY ONE, FOR ALLIED RESTRICTIONS; RETENTION OF THE CONTROL NECESSARY FOR EXERCISING OUR OWN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN BERLIN IS ALSO IMPORTANT.

-- BEFORE RECOMMENDING STEPS OF THIS NATURE, WE WOULD WANT TO BE CLEAR WHETHER THEY WERE TO BE TAKEN FOR RETALIATION OR FOR DETERRENCE. IF THE FORMER, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY BUT COULD BE STUDIED AND IMPLEMENTED DELIBERATELY, AFTER WE WERE CERTAIN THAT WE HAD IRREVERSIBLY LOST SUFFICIENT OF OUR RIGHTS IN EAST BERLIN TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE TO GIVE UP TO THE FRG AN ADDITIONAL SEGMENT OF OUR CONTROL OVER WEST BERLIN.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BONN 08303 02 OF 03 131658Z

THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN FULL CONSIDERATION OF THE NEED TO MAINTAIN ALLIED RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES INTO THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE STEPS WERE INTENDED AS A DETERRENT, THEY MIGHT BACKFIRE AND HAVE EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE EFFECT. AS SENIOR OFFICIALS RECOGNIZED IN APPROVING THE RECENT BONN GROUP ASSESSMENT, IT CANNOT BE EXCLUDED THAT THE RECENT ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE GDR WITH REGARD TO EAST BERLIN AND THE SOVIET DEMARCHE ON PATROLS WERE IN THEMSELVES REACTIONS TO WHAT THEY CONSIDERED AN UNACCEPTABLE ACCELERATION OF FRG ACTIVITIES IN BERLIN. IF SO, ADDITIONAL ACTIONS IN THAT SPHERE COULD SERVE TO FAN THE FLAMES AND BRING EVEN STRONGER CYCLES OF REACTION.

7. IN SUM, WHILE WE AGREE THAT THE US MAY IN TIME COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT A STRENGTHENED FEDERAL PRESENCE WOULD BE WARRANTED, WE DO NOT BELIEVE MEASURES TO THAT END WOULD SERVE OUR PURPOSE IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE TO OMIT REFERENCES TO SUCH MEASURES FROM THE PRESENT DRAFT BUT LEAVE THE ISSUE FOR THE MOMENT AS A MATTER FOR INTERNAL STUDY.

8. COORDINATION MECHANISMS. TWO QUESTIONS NOT TREATED IN THE US DRAFT BUT WHICH DESERVE EARLY CONSIDERATION HAVE TO

DO WITH THE FORM THE BONN GROUP STUDY SHOULD TAKE AND

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 BONN 08303 03 OF 03 131657Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00
PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-03 CIAE-00 INR-07
NSAE-00 DODE-00 IO-13 ACDA-07 /069 W
-----131719Z 104403 /53

O R 131633Z MAY 77 ZFF 4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8251
INFO USMISSION USBERLIN

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 08303

NOFORN

WITH THE POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES WHICH
WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IF WE WERE SUDDENLY FACED WITH A
BLOCKAGE OF ACCESS TO ALLIED PATROLS. IN
A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, THE THREE ALLIED
BONN GROUP REPS WERE OF THE OPINION THAT IT WOULD BE
PREFERABLE NOT TO SEEK A FORMAL AMENDMENT TO EXISTING
CONTINGENCY PLANS (BQD-CC-24), BUT RATHER TO TREAT THE
NEW STUDY AS A POLICY DOCUMENT. AMENDMENTS TO THE
BQD ITSELF WOULD BE CUMBERSOME AND TIME CONSUMING.

9. AS FOR POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING, THE BONN GROUP
WOULD OBVIOUSLY MEET TO MAKE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS,
BUT BEYOND THAT WE WOULD NEED FAIRLY URGENT
GUIDELINES ON HOW POLICY DECISIONS ARE TO BE REACHED.
WOULD THE WAG CONVENE, OR WOULD INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE
FOUR CAPITALS BE COORDINATED IN THE BONN GROUP, PERHAPS
AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL? (IN OUR VIEW THE LATTER WOULD
BE PREFERABLE, AS THERE IS GREATER BERLIN EXPERTISE
AMONG THE ALLIED AMBASSADORS IN BONN THAN IN THE WAG.)
TO WHAT EXTENT WOULD DECISIONS ON INDIVIDUAL COUNTER-
MEASURES (BLOCKING ACCESS OF SOVIET PATROLS, FOR
EXAMPLE) BE DELEGATED TO THE COMMANDANTS IN BERLIN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 08303 03 OF 03 131657Z

(RECOGNIZING THAT THE FRG WOULD HAVE NO CONSULTATIVE
VOICE THERE)? WHAT ROLE WOULD LIVE OAK PLAY? WOULD
QUADRIGA BE A USEFUL COORDINATING MECHANISM? LACK OF
ADVANCE PLANNING ON THESE QUESTIONS COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF CONSIDERABLE TIME IN THE EARLY CRISIS MANAGEMENT
PHASE. GUIDANCE ON THE DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON THESE
POINTS WOULD BE APPRECIATED.
STOESSEL

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SOVEREIGNTY, POLICIES, STATUS OF BERLIN, BERLIN QUADRIpartite MATTERS, REPRISALS, CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 13-May-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977BONN08303
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770169-0559
Format: TEL
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770563/aaaaccs.tel
Line Count: 290
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: f8833895-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NOFORN
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NOFORN
Reference: 77 SECTO 4014, 77 USBERLIN 1220
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28-Sep-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2542741
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING
TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, WB, UR, GE, GC, US, UK, FR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/f8833895-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009